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Many quarters of forensic science use reporting formats such as “identification,”
“inconclusive,” and “exclusion.” These types of conclusions express opinions as to
whether or not a particular person or object is the source of the material or traces
of unknown source that is of interest in a given case. Rendering an “inconclusive”
conclusion is sometimes criticized as being inadequate because—supposedly—it does
not provide recipients of expert information with helpful directions. In this paper, we
critically examine this claim using decision theory. We present and defend the viewpoint
according to which deciding to render an “inconclusive” conclusion is, on a formal
account, not as inadequate as may commonly be thought. Using elements of decision
theory from existing accounts on the topic, we show that inconclusive conclusions
can actually be viable alternatives with respect to other types of conclusions, such
as “identification.”
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1. INTRODUCTION
When forensic scientists compare questioned material of unknown source with material from a
known source, they are often faced with the question of whether the compared materials come
from the same source. For example, a fingerprint examiner may be asked to say whether a given
fingermark comes form a particular person of interest. Such conclusions are commonly known
as “source identifications” (e.g., DOJ, 2018). On the other hand, when the scientist is convinced
that the compared items come from different sources, the conclusion will be that the suspect is
excluded as the source of the trace (“source exclusion”). The term “inconclusive” is used when
“(...) the examiner is unable to identify or exclude the two impressions as originating from the
same source” (DOJ, 2018). Similar terminology is used by practitioners working with various other
types of traces, such as marks on fired bullets, shoemarks and even handwriting. The practice of
reporting forensic findings in terms of identification, inconclusive and exclusion (hereafter IIE)
currently faces a lot of criticism, however. The main criticism is that by providing such conclusions,
scientists directly express opinions about propositions of interest (i.e., the proposition of common
source), a task that is considered to be above and beyond their area of competence (Champod et al.,
2016). Rather than expressing opinions on propositions, scientists should concentrate on the value
of their findings—i.e., the results of their comparative examinations—and provide an assessment
of the extent to which those findings allow one to discriminate between the various propositions of
interest (Champod and Evett, 2001). In the latter—probabilistic—perspective, scientists help others,
i.e., the recipients of expert information, make appropriate use of scientific findings. With other
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types of traces, especially DNA, this separation of roles,
expressing probative value of the findings (scientists) on the one
hand vs. reaching conclusions about propositions (fact-finders)
on the other, has been in place since the beginnings of the use of
DNA in forensic science1.
While the IIE terminology is on the decline, mainly in
academic circles, it is not destined to disappear. The reason
is that, even though scientists may be gradually giving up
the IIE terminology when expressing and communicating their
findings, legal practitioners will still need to reach conclusions
regarding the source of particular items of trace material,
based on all available information in a case. Therefore, the
IIE terminology, in particular the ways in which the various
conclusions (identification, inconclusive, exclusion) are and
ought to be understood, is a topic of ongoing interest for research.
The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at
inconclusive conclusions, and how they are (to be) distinguished
from identifications and exclusions. Themotivation for this focus
of inquiry stems from the tendency in some quarters of forensic
science to regard “inconclusives” as producing unsatisfying
outcomes. Indeed, a report that findings are “inconclusive” in
a given case does not offer the recipient of expert information
an indication as to which of the propositions of interest is
supported by the evidence. This may be fine when the findings
are not considered informative (e.g., when the quality is poor
and/or there are only few observable features), but is more
problematic for findings that have some capacity to point toward
one proposition rather than the alternative. In such cases, using
the broad term “inconclusive” may give the impression that
the findings’ value is being lost or squandered in the process.
However, as we will show in this paper, the potential loss
associated with an erroneous identification or exclusion may be
even greater.
The intricacy of both the usefulness and limitations of
inconclusive decisions2 has recently prompted comments in the
forensic literature. Dror and Langenburg (2018), for example,
have noted:
“(...) the inconclusive decision is a broad and imprecise decision
category for fingerprint examiners, encompassing the range of
“almost an exclusion” all the way to “almost an identification.” As
such, the weight of the evidence may not be properly conveyed.
However, it is an important decision option for analysts to utilize
when they actually do not believe the weight of the evidence
has surpassed a decision threshold into a definitive categorical
decision (i.e., identification or exclusion ...).”
Inherent in statements such as these is the view that inconclusive
decisions, in some situations, are inadequate. It is important to
note, however, that this inadequacy merely reflects a perception:
1See, for example, the discussion by Stoney (1991) on the fundamentally different
approaches to interpretative reasoning on fingermark evidence as compared
to DNA.
2Note that throughout this paper, we will refer to conclusions provided by
forensic examiners as decisions in the sense that the choice of one among different
conclusions, such as IIE, is considered to be a decision (Biedermann et al., 2008,
2016). This has a direct impact on the formal methods of analysis that we will rely
upon in this paper (see also section 2).
the limited merit or benefit of an inconclusive decision as judged
by forensic practitioners and researchers, reflecting a widely held
mindset in the field. However, this judgment is not based on
a formal criterion. It may seem intuitively reasonable, but it
should be formally justified before it is accepted. This raises
a series of intriguing questions, such as “How can one assess
the relative merit of a given type of conclusion, in particular
inconclusive decisions, using a formal approach?” and “What
can a formal analysis of inconclusive decisions tell us about
our intuitive attitudes toward this type of conclusion (i.e., can
our intuitions be confirmed)?,” in particular “Are inconclusive
decisions in forensic science as inadequate as they are said to
be?.” In this paper, we will thus seek to approach the question
of the appropriateness of inconclusive conclusions in a formal
way.We will do so by conducting a comparative analysis between
the perception of expert decision making (i.e., decisions on what
to conclude following an expert’s examination), and a formal
analysis of the expert reporting task.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the
formal method for decision analysis, i.e., decision theory, used
throughout this paper, provides definitions and introduces
formal notation. In section 3, this analytical apparatus is used to
analyse and clarify the conceptual characteristics of inconclusive
decisions, and to compare them with those of other types of
decisions, especially identifications. Discussion and conclusions
are presented in section 4. Here we will present and defend the
viewpoint according to which inconclusive decisions, on a formal
account, are not as inadequate as may commonly be thought.
Actually, as our analyses will show, inconclusive decisions are
viable alternatives with respect to other conclusions, such as
identification; under certain conditions inconclusive decisions
will even be “better” (or, more optimal), in a sense that will
be defined later, than identification decisions despite a high
probability for the proposition according to which the person
of interest, rather than an unknown person, is the source of
the trace.
2. METHODS AND DEFINITIONS
As a starting point for our analysis, we consider expert
conclusions as decisions. Given this fundamental starting point,
we can proceed further and invoke a formal theory to analyse,
characterize and compare decisions: the obvious candidate here
is decision theory (e.g., Raiffa, 1968; Lindley, 1985), because it
is the reference approach for devising sensible courses of action
to be taken by a decision-maker in situations in which adverse
decision consequences may be incurred due to uncertainty
about the propositions of interest (e.g., Taroni et al., 2005,
2010; Biedermann et al., 2008). In our context of application,
examples of propositions are whether the person of interest or
an unknown person is the source of a given mark or stain.
The fundamental decision problem thus is that, at the time of
issuing a conclusion, the examiner does not know whether or
not the person of interest truly is the source of the crime mark.
Therefore, there is a possibility of incurring, for example, a
wrong identification.
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We use the following notation for the decision theoretic
analyses. We denote by d1, d2 and d3 the three IIE conclusions
“identification,” “inconclusive,” and “exclusion,” respectively.
Note that one of these conclusions must be given. A choice is to
be made among the options di, j = 1, 2, 3, in light of uncertainty
about whether the proposition θ1, the person of interest is the
source of the crime mark, or θ2, an unknown person is the
source, is true. The propositions θj, j = 1, 2, also sometimes
called states of nature, combine with decisions di to lead to
decision consequences, denoted Cij. For example, deciding to
identify, d1, when the person of interest is in fact the source of
the crime stain, θ1, amounts to a correct identification C11. A
further element of our analytical apparatus is the desirability of
decision consequences, operationalized here in terms of utility,
denoted U(Cij). A decision-maker will face the problem or will
need to complete the task of assigning to any decision outcome an
expression of desirability that encompasses various dimensions,
such as the consequences faced by participants in the proceedings
and society at large, as well as societal and systemic values. For
the purpose of our analysis, we will measure the desirability of
decision outcomes on the standard 0 − 1 scale, assigning the
value 1 to the most desirable consequence(s), and the value 0 to
the worst consequence(s). Utility values can be elicited by relying
on a procedure described, for example, by Lindley (1985, 2006)
that involves coherent comparisons with reference consequences
for which the decision-maker has agreed utility values (e.g., 0
and 1). Obviously, the decision-maker is free to choose different
reference consequences to build the utility function, and also
different scales.
3. ANALYSES AND RESULTS
3.1. Preliminaries
In discourses about decisions, especially decision analysis and
decision-making, it is important to be rigorous in the use of
terminology3. It is not uncommon, for example, to encounter
assertions such as “the utility of this decision is low” or “we seek
to maximize utility.” Such assertions are unsound in a classic
decision-theoretic sense. Before proceeding, we thus clarify two
points. First, following the definition given in section 2, utility
does not characterize a decision, but a decision consequence (or,
outcome). The latter is an outcome resulting from a specific
action taken when a given event (or, state of nature) is true.
Second, in decision theory, decisions are characterized in terms
of expected utility. Since there is uncertainty about the state of
nature, at the time of making a decision, one cannot know which
consequence (with associated utility) will be obtained4. At best,
thus, only the expectation in terms of utility for a given decision
can be given, by combining uncertainty about states of nature
(quantified in terms of probability) and desirability of possible
consequences (expressed in terms of utility). It follows from this
that, when there is uncertainty about the state of nature (i.e.,
3Readers well acquainted with decision theory may skip this section.
4In the present paper, we will consider only the situations where the consequences
Cij as a result of a combination between a decision di and a state of nature θj are
certain. Cases where there is uncertainty about the consequences are not covered.
and hence what outcome will be obtained), one cannot maximize
utility as one could do whenever the state of nature is known,
by simply taking the decision to which is associated the larger
utility; at best one can only sort out the decision which has
the highest expected utility. In the next sections, we will rely on
expected utility to analyse and compare rival decisions. This may
sound technical, but we will show that with suitable choices of the
measuring scales and of a pair of consequences that are treated
as benchmarks, the proposed framework simplifies considerably
and becomes suitable for forensic purposes (or forensic science
applications) by limiting the number of choices to be made by
the decision-maker during the elicitation of the utility function.
In fact, it will be shown that point value assessments for the
various components of the analysis are not necessarily required
because assessments can also be considered in a qualitative and
comparative way.
3.2. Analysing and Comparing Rival
Decisions
We now consider each of the three IIE conclusions in turn and
analyse their properties from a decision theoretic viewpoint.
• Identification: The consequences of deciding “identification,”
d1, can either be (i) a correct identification C11 (which occurs
when θ1 is true, i.e., the person of interest is the source
of the crime stain), or (ii) a false identification C12 (which
occurs when θ2 is true, i.e., an unknown person is the source).
It is safe to assume that, generally, a correct identification
C11 is the overall most desirable outcome
5, whereas a false
identification C12 is the overall worst (i.e., most undesirable)
outcome. According to the chosen 0−1 scale, and following the
approach according to which the best and worst consequences
are taken as benchmarks, we thus assign the utility 1 to a
correct identification, and the utility 0 to a false identification.
Now, if we weigh each of these utilities with the probability of
occurrence of the respective consequence6, i.e., we compute
the expected utility EU of the identification decision d1, we
find that:
EU(d1) = U(C11)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Pr(θ1 | I)+ U(C12)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
Pr(θ2 | I)
= Pr(θ1 | I).
In short, this result means that, given the so-built utility
function, the expected utility of an identification decision is
directly proportional to the probability that the person of
interest is the source of the crime stain. Or, stated otherwise,
the higher the decision-maker’s belief in the truth of the
proposition that the person of interest is the source of the
crime stain, the higher the decision-maker’s expected utility
5Note that there may be more than one “best” (“worst”) outcome. For example,
one may consider a correct exclusion equally desirable as a correct identification.
6The probability of occurrence of a given consequence depends on the probability
of the given state of nature, denoted here by θ . Generally, we condition
probabilities by the relevant background knowledge, denoted I. Hence, we write
the probability that the person of interest is the source of the mark, given the
available information, as Pr(θ1 | I).
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for the decision to identify the person of interest (see also
discussion in Biedermann et al., 2008).
• Inconclusive: Here we are directed to think about the
desirability of two consequences: (1) the consequence C21,
resulting from concluding “inconclusive” d2 when the person
of interest is the source of the mark (θ1 is true), and (2) the
consequence C22, resulting from an inconclusive decision d2
when an unknown person is the source of the crime scene
mark (θ2 is true). Note that reporting “inconclusive” will
suggest to the recipient of expert information that the findings
should be considered as neutral. Hence, it may be argued that
it makes no difference whether an “inconclusive” is obtained in
the event of θ1 (i.e., the person of interest is the source) or θ2
(i.e., an unknown person is the source), so that the two utilities
U(C12) and U(C22) can be taken to be equivalent. Under
this assumption, the expected utility EU of an inconclusive
decision d2 becomes:
EU(d2) = U(C21) Pr(θ1 | I)+ U(C22) Pr(θ2 | I)
= α, if α = U(C21) = U(C22).
The immediate question now is: how can α be elicited? We
will address this question in due course in section 3.3. For the
time being, we only retain the important insight that, while the
expected utility of an identification decision depends on (i.e.,
corresponds to) the probability that the person of interest is
the source of the crime stain (proposition θ1), the expected
utility of an inconclusive decision is a constant; i.e., it does
not depend on the probabilities of the propositions θ1 and
θ2. Instead, it corresponds to the utilities U(C21) and U(C22),
which are taken to be equal.
• Exclusion: Here we focus on the following two consequences:
(1) C31, the consequence of concluding “exclusion” (d3) when
in fact the person of interest is the source of the crime stain
(θ1), and (2) C32, the consequence of concluding “exclusion”
(d3) in the event that an unknown person is the source (θ2).
The latter, C32, is an accurate conclusion and we can assign to
it the utility 1, expressing the idea that it is as desirable as an
accurate identification (see consequence C11 above). A wrong
exclusion, C31, is an inaccurate determination, and we should
thus assign it a low utility to express that it is an undesirable
outcome. One can ask, however, whether a false exclusion is as
undesirable as a wrong identification (consequence C12). For
the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that we consider
the utility of a wrong exclusion, U(C31), to be equal to zero.
The expected utility of decision d3 (exclusion) then is:
EU(d3) = U(C31)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
Pr(θ1 | I)+ U(C32)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Pr(θ2 | I)
= Pr(θ2 | I).
As can be seen, since Pr(θ2 | I) = 1 − Pr(θ1 | I), the expected
utility of an “exclusion” is one minus the expected utility of an
“identification.” The latter was found to be equal to Pr(θ1 | I),
the probability that the person of interest is the source, whereas
the former is found to be equal to Pr(θ2 | I), the probability
that an unknown person is the source. Note that this result, the
expected utility of an exclusion being directly proportional to
the probability of the alternative proposition (θ2), follows from
the assumption that a wrong exclusion has a utility of zero,
U(C31) = 0, hence offering a symmetry between decisions.
The reader is free to consider a different ranking, for example
one where a wrong exclusion is felt to be less undesirable than
a wrong identification, hence to assume a value for U(C31)
greater than zero7. However, it may be easily shown that, for
values close to zero, the expected utility EU(d3) for exclusions
will correspond, approximately, to Pr(θ2 | I).
It follows from the above considerations that, despite the
seemingly technical arguments involved, the expected utilities of
the three decisions of interest reduce to rather basic terms: in case
of the conclusions “identification” and “exclusion,” the modest
assumptions made (e.g., the 0− 1 scale, the particular ranking of
preferences and the choice of the reference consequences) imply
that the expected utilities are values given by the probabilities
for the main propositions θ1 and θ2, respectively (i.e., the
person of interest or an unknown person being the source of
the crime stain). The typical objection is that these numbers
are “unknown”8 to the decision-maker. However, it must be
acknowledged that they reflect the decision-maker’s level of
uncertainty, given all the relevant information available at the
time that the decision needs to be made. Therefore, these
probabilities are, in principle, available to the decision-maker.
So, a utility elicitation is not really needed for consequences
of decisions d1 (identification) and d3 (exclusion). In turn,
the expected utility of inconclusive decisions is a constant
that corresponds to the utility assigned to the consequences of
inconclusive decisions irrespective of which states of nature, θ1
and θ2, is true. Eliciting this utility requires further considerations
(see below in section 3.3). Note that, whenever a different ranking
is considered (e.g., considering a false exclusion to be a less severe
outcome than a false identification), the elicitation process will
be slightly more demanding. Further elaboration of this is given
in Biedermann et al. (2008).
These considerations do not tell us yet how adequate
(or inadequate) an inconclusive decision is, and how
such a conclusion compares to rival decisions, such as an
“identification.” As is clear from the above development, the
utility of the consequences of reporting “inconclusive” is the
pivotal issue. We will consider this question in the next section.
3.3. Clarifying Utility Elicitation for
Consequences of “Inconclusives” and
Determining Optimal Decisions
Eliciting a value for α, the utility of the consequences of
reporting “inconclusive” (C31 and C32), amounts to locating
α on the range of utilities between 0 and 1, keeping in
mind that these values have been assigned to, respectively,
the worst and the best consequences (see also section 3.2
7See Biedermann et al. (2008) for examples and graphical illustrations of situations
in which U(C31) is considered different from zero.
8See Biedermann (2015) for a review of historical sources on why assertions of
non-knowledge of probabilities (i.e., “unknown probabilities”) are nonsensical.
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FIGURE 1 | Representation of the utilities for the best decision consequences,
correct identification (C11) and correct exclusion (C32), assigned as 1, and the
worst consequences, false identification (C12) and false exclusion (C31),
assigned as zero. The utility that remains to be elicited is α, the value assigned
for the consequences of reporting “inconclusive,” C21 and C22. It can take
any value in the range between 0 and 1 (including these endpoints).
and summary in Figure 1). This utility assignment—which will
directly determine the expected utility of the decision to report
“inconclusive” (following the considerations given in section
3.2)—is meaningful in the sense that, if we consider the decision
consequences of “inconclusives” of value, their utility should
tend toward the utilities of the best decision consequences; in
turn, if we consider “inconclusives” of low value, the assigned
utility should tend toward those assigned to the worst decision
consequences. The tricky issue is, however, to elicit this key utility
(α) in a transparent way.
To overcome this challenge, we can invoke a standard
device for utility elicitation (De Groot, 1970) that involves
the comparison of, on the one hand, the consequence for
which a utility needs to be assigned (here, the consequence of
deciding “inconclusive”), and on the other hand, two reference
consequences for which utilities are available. We choose
these reference consequences to be a correct identification
(consequence C11) and a false identification (consequence C12),
i.e., examples of the best and worst consequence, respectively.
The consequence of an inconclusive decision thus is intermediate
with respect to these two reference consequences. The procedure
for utility elicitation, summarized in Figure 2, then works
as follows9:
• Imagine you have two options. The first option is to have—
for sure—the intermediate consequence, C2· (i.e., either C21 or
C22), the result of an inconclusive decision. The second option
is a situation in which youmay incur the best consequence, i.e.,
a correct identification (C11), with probability α, and the worst
consequence, i.e., a false identification (C12) with probability
1− α.
• Next, ask yourself what would be the probability α in the
second option that would make you indifferent between
options 1 and 2. Stated otherwise, you need to give the
probability α with which the second option would give you
the best consequence (and with probability 1 − α the worst
consequence) so that you would be prepared to exchange it
with option 1 (which implies the intermediate consequenceC2·
for sure).
9See Biedermann et al. (2008, 2016) and Taroni et al. (2010) for further details on
the mathematical background of the procedure.
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the utility elicitation procedure. Option 1 involves
having the consequence of deciding “inconclusive” for sure. Option 2 involves
having the best consequence (correct identification, C11) with probability α
and the worst consequence (false identification, C12) with probability 1− α.
The procedure asks one to specify the probability that would make one
indifferent between option 1 and option 2. This value then corresponds to the
utility of the consequence for which a value needs to be elicited (here, the
consequence of deciding “inconclusive,” C2·). Note that the particular value α
shown in the figure is an example. The value α can vary in both directions
toward 0 and 1, as illustrated by the edges← and→.
• It can be shown (De Groot, 1970) that the utility for
the intermediate consequences can be found, under modest
conditions, as
αU(C11)+ (1− α)U(C12) = α.
The probability α in option 2 that makes it equivalent,
for you, to option 1 then is your utility for the
intermediate consequence (i.e., the consequence of deciding
inconclusive, C2·).
One way to look at this utility elicitation procedure is to focus
on the following key question: how low should the probability of
incurring the worst consequence in option 2 be in order to make
it “viable” for the decision-maker, i.e., so that option 2 appears as
acceptable as option 1 (in which the decision-maker would obtain
the consequence of deciding “inconclusive” for sure)? Under the
generally accepted view that wrongly identifying a person of
interest is a consequence that ought to be avoided, this probability
should be low, or even very low. Accordingly, the probability of
obtaining the best consequence in option 2 will be high, or very
high. But this probability—in our procedure—corresponds to the
utility of the consequence of deciding “inconclusive”; and, thus,
will be (very) high, too.
As we have seen, consequences of “inconclusive” decisions
are not as inadequate as one may think they are. In particular,
if the requirement is to make up one’s mind seriously and
justify a coherent ordering of decision consequences, which
involves the proper appreciation of both highly desirable and
undesirable decision consequences, the utility of consequences of
inconclusive decisions can actually be found to be (very) high—
unless one holds unusual preferences such as not considering
a wrong identification as undesirable. This analysis also raises
critical questions, however, and we discuss them further in the
next section.
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1. Objections
A possible objection to the result of the previous section is that
terms such as “low” or “very low” (associated to probabilities or
utilities) are undefined. Also, it may be argued that questions
such as “how low should the probability of incurring the worst
consequence in option 2 be (...)?” (section 3.3 and Figure 2),
cannot be answered in principle because they require a numerical
precision that, in practice, most importantly in real casework,
cannot be achieved. But this does not imply that the development
as such is inapplicable or of no value. The value of the
conceptual framework consists in helping to scrutinize and
understand the logical properties of our qualitative and verbal
assertions, and to critically examine intuitive judgments. Take,
for example, the following statement, that follows from our
conceptual framework:
The assessment of the utility of the consequence of an inconclusive
decision is tied—i.e., inversely proportional—to the probability
of incurring the worst consequence that the decision-maker
considers acceptable.
Precise numbers are not necessary to see how the underpinning
concepts in this statement relate to each other. However
desirable or undesirable one intuitively judges the consequence
of an inconclusive decision (i.e., without a check against a
logical analysis of the problem), our framework tells us that,
in a qualitative sense, the smaller the probability of a wrong
identification (in option 2; Figure 2), the higher one’s utility for the
consequence of an inconclusive decision. Thus, a person cannot be
averse to a wrong identification and consider the consequence
of an inconclusive decision as having a low utility without being
incoherent. This is one example of what we mean by scrutinizing
the logical properties of (intuitive) judgments that commentators
may maintain.
As regards the issue of numeracy, the above qualitative level of
analysis is the minimum to which one needs to commit oneself in
order to issue meaningful statements, for no helpful guidance can
be conveyed without at least a qualitative statement about how
distinct assessments compare and relate to each other. This view
is not new. It has previously been raised in defense of the use of
probabilistic reasoning. For example, Friedman has noted: “(...)
the theory need not be applied in its most powerful gear. On the
contrary, it is a flexible template. It can take into account as much
complexity as its user is able to handle.” (Friedman, 1997, p. 288)
More recently, the same author has noted:
“(...) the concept of magnitude is essential. It is not enough to say
that the harm caused by an incorrect choice of [decision] one is
greater than that caused by an incorrect choice of [decision] two;
to set the standard of persuasion appropriately, we need to have a
sense of how much worse one error is than the other.” (Friedman,
2018, p. 2).
Critics may find this guidance unhelpful and argue that, at the
end of the day, they still do not know how much worse one
consequence ought to be judged than another. However, such an
objection merely shows that the kind of question that needs to be
addressed is not a scientific one, as it goes beyond the scope of the
forensic practitioner’s area of competence (e.g., Stoney, 2012).
4.2. Summary: Clarifying the Notion of
“Inconclusive” Decisions
Inconclusive decisions have recently attracted skeptical
comments in forensic science literature. For example, Dror
and Langenburg refer to them as a “broad and imprecise decision
category for fingerprint examiners” (Dror and Langenburg,
2018, p. 5) and distinguish them from what they call a “definitive
categorical decision (i.e., identification or exclusion ...)” (Dror
and Langenburg, 2018, p. 5). We have argued throughout this
paper, using a formal analysis, that inconclusive decisions are
not “imprecise,” but can be given a precise definition which is as
clear as the definitions of the rival decisions “identification” and
“exclusion.” Stated otherwise, “inconclusive” decisions are no less
“definite” than identification or exclusion decisions.
The results of the analysis and related effects considered
in this paper may not be intuitively obvious. Moreover, it
must be emphasized that the discussed decisional problem has
been simplified for the sake of illustration. This means that,
in practice, a decision-maker may need to handle situations
where the answer is even less obvious. It is important, therefore,
that discussions about inconclusive decisions be clear about the
way in which the key elements of a decision problem, such as
decisions, states of nature and consequences are defined, and
how the desirability/undesirability of incurred outcomes can
be measured. Moreover, as our development shows, intuitive
approaches to the notion of “inconclusive” decisions may be
liable to fallacious or counterintuitive claims: for example, it
follows from our analyses that inconclusive decisions are not as
inadequate as they are generally said to be – though there can
be situations in which they do not represent the optimal course
of action (i.e., reporting conclusion). Below, we will restate this
result and summarize some of the other accompanying insights.
1. First and foremost, it is important to note that the term
“utility” qualifies the desirability/undesirability of decision
consequences, such as the outcome (i.e., consequence) of
deciding “identification” when in fact the person of interest is
the source of the crime stain. This is an example of an accurate
decision outcome, and generally regarded as desirable, yet
the decision “identification” itself does not have an utility.
Because it is not known, at the time of making the decision,
which state of nature actually holds (i.e., whether the person
of interest or an unknown person is the source of the stain),
one can—at best—consider the expected utility of a decision.
The expected value of a decision is obtained by weighing
the utilities of the possible decision consequences by their
respective probability of occurrence: for example, the utility of
a correct identification will be discounted by the probability of
obtaining it. Different rival decisions can be characterized and
compared based on their expected utility; the idea being that
a decision is considered “better” that another if its expected
value is greater than that of the other.
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2. Obtaining the expected utility of a decision may involve
tedious steps, such as the elicitation of the utility function.
However, it has been shown in our application to forensic
identification that under modest and entirely reasonable
assumptions (see section 3.2), the number of values that will
need to be elicited is small. The expected utilities of all three
decisions of interest reduce to clearly recognizable forms (see
also on the right in Figure 3):
• Identification: The expected utility of an identification
corresponds (i.e., is directly proportional) to the decision-
maker’s probability that the person of interest, rather than
an unknown person, is the source of the crime stain:
EU(d1) = Pr(θ1 | I), shown as an ascending straight line.
• Exclusion: The expected utility of an exclusion is inversely
proportional to the decision-maker’s probability that the
person of interest, rather than an unknown person, is the
source of the crime stain: EU(d3) = 1− Pr(θ1 | I), depicted
as a descending straight line.
• Inconclusive: The expected utility of an inconclusive
decision is a constant (denoted here α), shown as a
straight horizontal line. Following the elicitation procedure
introduced in section 3.3 (summarized in the middle of
Figure 3), this utility is related to the decision-makers’
aversion for a false identification.
In summary, thus, the utilities of the consequences of all three
rival decisions are fixed. The expected utilities of the decisions,
however, vary as a function of the probability that the person
of interest, rather than an unknown person, is the source
of the crime stain (proposition θ), except for the decision
“inconclusive”: its expected utility is equal to the utility of the
related decision consequences and is not influenced by the
uncertainty about the state of nature θ10.
3. Regarding the particular case of inconclusive decisions, we
note that, as the decision-maker’s probability (1−α) associated
to a false identification (in option 2; Figure 2) decreases (i.e.,
tends to zero), the utility for the consequences of inconclusive
decisions increases (i.e., tends toward one). Stated otherwise,
a decision-maker who will only consider acceptable to make a
false identification (in option 2; Figure 2) with a low (or very
low) probability (1 − α) will maintain a high utility for the
consequence of an inconclusive decision. In the extreme case
in which the acceptable probability for a false identification is
zero, the decision-maker:
• considers the consequence of an inconclusive decision
as desirable as an accurate conclusion, i.e., a correct
identification or exclusion, expressed in terms of an utility
of 1, and
• considers an inconclusive decision as optimal in all
situations. As seen in Figure 3, for (1−α) = 0, the expected
utility of an inconclusive decision takes the value 1, and no
other decision (i.e., identification or exclusion) has a higher
expected utility across the entire scope of probabilities for
10Note again that these properties and observations follow from the preference
structure and assumptions outlined in section 3.2.
states of nature θ . Moreover, an inconclusive decision will
have a higher expected utility than all other decisions except
for the special cases where Pr(θ1 | I) is either zero or one.
In the former case, both the expected utility of an exclusion
and of an inconclusive decision are 1; in the latter case, both
the expected utility of an identification and an inconclusive
decision take the value 1.
Finally, note also that the formal criterion for singling out
optimal decisions used in this paper should be understood as a
conditional advice (Biedermann et al., 2018), the scheme does
not prescribe particular decisions. It is perfectly conceivable
that a decision maker may decide to report “inconclusive”
even though—according to the formal analysis—an identification
may be the optimal decision (i.e., the decision with the
maximum expected utility). This does not necessarily represent
a problem, but a situation that would merit further inquiry,
including a review of one’s evaluation of undesirability of adverse
consequences. Indeed, there may be various circumstantial
(and legitimate) reasons and personal motives that drive a
person to act in a way that is suboptimal with respect to
the recommendations following the maximum expected utility
criterion. For example, the decision-maker may wish to avoid
the overall worst consequence (i.e., a false identification)
at all costs, a goal that can only be achieved by never
selecting the identification decision d1 (Biedermann and
Vuille, 2018). See also Dror and Langenburg (2018) further
discussion about the justification, and possible lack thereof, of
inconclusive decisions.
4.3. Scrutinizing General Claims and
Decision Policies
Throughout this paper, we have argued that the decision-analytic
approach does not seek to impose a numerical precision to
all practical arguments if the discussants are not willing to
engage with it. Instead, we have emphasized that the merit of
the approach consists in scrutinizing the logical foundations of
general claims and opinions commonly raised by practitioners
and researchers in the field of forensic identification. The
particular claim we have looked at, shown to be unreasonable
and refuted, is to say that inconclusive decisions are inadequate,
vague and undefined. Specifically, we have shown that, unless the
decision-maker shows little concern about false identifications,
inconclusive decisions not only have
• a high expected utility (i.e., close to 1), but
• also represent the most preferable conclusion in a
predominant number of the possible cases (i.e., cases
differing by their probability for the proposition that the
person of interest is the source).
To conclude, we illustrate our point with one last observation.
Consider the claim that “inconclusive” decisions, because of
their alleged drawbacks, should disappear, and a given expert
would always have to report either an “identification” or an
“exclusion.” Would such a conclusion policy make sense? What
would it imply, conceptually? We can investigate these questions
by studying the plot shown on the right in Figure 3. As is
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FIGURE 3 | (Left) Definition of the (0, 1) utility scale and assignment of utilities of 1 to the best decision consequences (i.e., correct identification, C11, and correct
exclusion, C31) and utilities of 0 to the worst consequences (i.e., false identification, C12, and false exclusion, C31). The utility α of the consequences of inconclusive
decisions can take any value between 0 and 1, including these endpoints. (Middle) Elicitation of the utility for consequences of inconclusive decisions based on a
comparison between two options. The utility of an inconclusive decision is obtained as the probability α with which Option 2 leads to the best consequence (and with
probability (1− α) to the worst consequence), such that Option 2 is as desirable as Option 1 (which offers the consequence of an inconclusive decision for sure).
(Right) Representation of the expected utilities of decisions “identification” (d1), “inconclusive” (d2) and “exclusion” (d3) (the bold line indicates the decision with the
highest expected utility). The vertical dashed lines indicate transition points, i.e., where one decision becomes preferable to another decision (i.e., where one decision
has a higher expected utility than another). Note, in particular, that the smaller the acceptable probability (1− α) for a false identification (C12) elicited in the procedure
illustrated in the Figure in the middle, the closer to 1 the expected utility of the decision “inconclusive” in the Figure on the right, and hence the smaller the ranges of
probabilities for θ1 (i.e., the proposition according to which the person of interest is the source) for which either “identification” or “exclusion” will be the optimal
decisions (i.e., decisions with the highest expected utility). In the extreme case, when the acceptable probability (1− α) for incurring a false identification is zero, the
expected utility of the decision “inconclusive” is 1, and hence maximal, in all cases (i.e., regardless of the probability of θ1).
readily seen, in order for the inconclusive decision to have a
lower expected utility than either the decision “identification”
or “exclusion,” one needs to assume a higher probability (1− α)
for incurring a false identification. Specifically, for the case
depicted in Figure 3 (right), and the assumptions made in
Section 3.3, the utility of the consequence of an inconclusive
decision would need to be lower than 0.5. However, this would
also mean that the decision-maker would be considerably less
averse to a false identification. As the utility elicitation procedure
shows (Figure 3, middle), assessing α < 0.5 would mean that
the decision-maker is prepared to “exchange” the consequence
of an inconclusive decision (Option 1) with an option which
leads to a false identification with probability (1 − α), which
is greater than 0.5 (i.e., Option 2). It is difficult to imagine
any criminal case in which such a preference structure would
be defensible.
Although our analyses in this paper highlight valuable features
of inconclusive decisions, we do not intend to convey the idea
that this type of conclusion, or any other type of conclusion
in the IIE paradigm, is suitable or recommendable for forensic
scientists. In fact, as has been emphasized, deciding what to
conclude requires value judgments (i.e., utilities/losses) that are
widely considered to be beyond the scientist’s area of competence
(e.g., Champod et al., 2016). Instead it is more suitable and
defensible for forensic scientists to limit their reporting to their
observations and findings only, and their associated probative
value (e.g., Willis et al., 2015).
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